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ABSTRACT 
On March 12, 2003, the World Health Organization (WHO) issued a global 
alert for Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS). This is a deadly infectious 
disease with a rapid onset that is spread by person-to-person contact. WHO and 
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) immediately started an 
intense coordinated investigation that resulted in the identification of the SARS-
associated coronavirus (SARS-Co V) as the causative agent (CDC, 2003a). By the 
time this outbreak was brought to an end, more than 8,000 cases and 780 deaths 
had been reported (CDC, 2004b). Numerous workers in the healthcare industry, 
laboratories, universities, and airports were among the morbidity and mortality 
statistics. As a result, occupational health professionals have been reminded of 
the necessity to develop policies and procedures to ensure surveillance, prompt 
recognition of infectious illnesses, immediate treatment, and protection of the 
workforce. 
The SARS outbreak illustrated the potential for a new disease to emerge 
and spread quickly in today' s global economy where there is daily international 
travel and interaction. The emergence ofSARS also allowed the world to see that 
traditional public health measures to control disease spread, including 
surveillance, infection control, isolation, and quarantine are productive and 
effective. It also demonstrated the necessity of preplanning for such disease 
outbreaks. 
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The role of occupational and environmental health nurses was expanded to 
include more surveillance for the re-emergence of SARS or the emergence of new 
infectious diseases this year or next. The American Association of Occupational 
Health Nurses (AAOHN) has assumed a leadership role in monitoring the 
emerging infectious diseases and issuing information to its members. WHO and 
CDC continue to be global leaders in the efforts to quickly identifY newly 
emerging infectious diseases and find a vaccine for those infectious diseases 
already identified. Many other professional organizations are working to promote 
research in the field of infectious respiratory diseases. 
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Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome: A Global Impact 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) is a highly contagious 
respiratory disease that infected 8,098 persons and led to more than 780 deaths 
between November 1, 2002 and July 31,2003 (World Health Organization 
(WHO), 2003b). The case fatality ratio worldwide was 9.6% (Shapiro & 
McCauley, 2004). Due to the volume of international travel, emerging infectious 
diseases such as SARS are difficult to contain within the borders of a country or 
geographic area and pose a high risk of spread to many countries with one 
outbreak. 
The SARS outbreak in 2003 along with the recurrent outbreaks in China in 
April 2004 have presented the public health community with an opportunity and a 
challenge to identifY an emerging infectious disease rapidly and respond quickly 
and appropriately to prevent further spread of the disease. The World Health 
Organization (WHO) and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
developed a case definition for SARS and immediately began developing a series 
of recommendations and guidelines for the healthcare community to use to 
control the spread of the virus, identifY potential new cases and close contacts, 
and educate healthcare workers to protect themselves from contracting SARS. 
Occupational and environmental health nurses (OEHNs) are being thrust 
into roles of disease prevention, symptom detection, and management of SARS 
and other emerging infectious disease outbreaks. Infectious disease control 
measures must include engineering, administrative, environmental, and personal 
protective equipment (PPE). OEHNs will be involved in education and training 
of the workforce both in hospital and industrial settings. 
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This paper will focus on the SARS outbreak of2003 along with the new 
outbreak in China in April2004 that resulted in nine cases with one fatality. The 
guidelines issued by the CDC to prevent further outbreaks of the disease and to 
promptly identify and report potential new cases and close contacts of cases will 
be reviewed. The paper will also consider the impacts ofSARS on select 
populations such as healthcare workers, laboratory workers, customs and airport 
personnel, and frequent business travelers. The role ofOEHNs will be explored 
in the prevention, detection, and management of SARS and other emerging 
infectious disease outbreaks. 
CHAPTER2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
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In 2003, there was limited information published about SARS as it was a 
new infectious disease. Then an explosion of information occurred to identify, 
control, and prevent the disease. 
Case Definition 
When SARS first emerged as a new infectious disease, the medical 
community struggled to quickly develop a case definition for the syndrome and 
the definition went through several revisions. The CDC established case 
definitions for health care workers to identify individuals with SARS (CDC, 
2003a). Reported cases are classified into two categories based on clinical 
presentation -"suspect" and "probable". The case definition criteria are (1) fever 
greater than 100.4° F, (2) respiratory symptoms (cough, shortness ofbreath, 
and/or difficulty breathing), and (3) travel to an area known to be endemic for 
SARS or close contact with a known SARS patient (Khare, Wachter, & Barnosky, 
2004). The case definition of SARS was updated on July 17, 2003 with a negative 
antibody titer for SARS-related coronavirus necessary to rule out a suspected or 
probable case (CDC, 2004e). 
Causative Agent 
SARS is caused by a previously unrecognized and newly described 
coronavirus called SARS-associated corona virus (SARS-Co V) (National Institute 
of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, 2004). Prior to SARS, these viruses with a 
spiky, crown-like appearance had caused only mild respiratory infections. The 
coronavirus that causes SARS is in the same virus family as the common cold, 
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and because of this, the winter months are a period of high risk ofSARS infection 
(Khare et al., 2004). The genetic material contained in the SARS-Co V is highly 
pathogenic; however, the RNA must be studied to determine the structure and 
function of the viral proteins. Researchers are attempting to determine how the 
immune system responds to the SARS-Co V and if there are human genetic 
variations that make one person more susceptible than another. Studies are also 
being done on inflammation and airway hypersensitivity and the ways SARS-
Co V may evade destruction by immune system cells (National Institute of Allergy 
and Infectious Diseases, 2004). 
The virulence of the SARS-Co V is thought to be that it multiplies 
rapidly, killing cells in the lungs and this causes an immune response that destroys 
more lung cells (Khare et al., 2004). According to two studies in China published 
May 2004, the SARS coronavirus and the receptor protein it latches on to are 
found in multiple organs throughout the body, such as the intestines, lungs, 
stomach, kidneys, sweat glands, parathyroid, pituitary, pancreas, adrenal gland, 
and liver (MedlinePlus, 2004b). These studies imply that the virus may be 
excreted in sweat, urine, and feces. 
Mode of Transmission 
Person-to-Person 
Transmission of SARS appears to result mostly from close person-to-
person contact and contact with large respiratory droplets emitted when a person 
sneezes or coughs (Kanof, 2003). Infected persons are contagious when 
symptomatic and that is when they tend to seek medical attention and come into 
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contact with healthcare workers. One characteristic ofthe SARS outbreak was 
the high rate of infection among healthcare workers (Kanof, 2003). The disease 
can also spread rapidly in the community due to person-to-person contact. Close 
contact is usually described as having cared for, lived with, or having contact with 
bodily secretions of an infected person (Kanof, 2003). 
Droplet 
The transmission ofSARS appears to be spread most often by large 
droplets (Shapiro & McCauley, 2004). Droplets containing SARS-CoV can be 
released into the air when an infected person sneezes, coughs, or talks. Some 
medical procedures performed on infected persons can also cause the droplets to 
be released into the air. After contact, the incubation period for SARS- the time 
it takes for symptoms to appear- is generally within a 1 0-day period and often 
about 4 - 6 days (Kanof, 2003). It is not known how long after symptoms appear 
that SARS patients transmit the virus to others. There is no evidence that SARS 
can be transmitted from persons who are asymptomatic (Kanof, 2003). 
Contaminated Objects 
SARS may be spread if an uninfected person touches infected respiratory 
droplets that have been deposited on objects such as tables, chairs, office 
equipment and handrails. Touching a SARS-Co V infected surface, such as a 
doorknob or telephone, and then touching the fingers to the mouth, nose, or eyes 
may transfer the virus. 
Airborne 
Airborne contact is defined as "contact with small droplets ( 5 micrometers 
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or smaller) or dust particles containing the microorganism, which are suspended 
in air" (Kanof, 2003, p. 7). Some clusters of disease have been spread by 
"superspreader events" in which transmission occurred from a single case to 
multiple secondary cases (Shapiro & McCauley, 2004). The CDC has not ruled 
out the possibility that SARS may be spread broadly through the air. 
Signs and Symptoms 
SARS usually begins with flu-like symptoms that include a high fever, 
chills, headache, muscle aches, and an overall feeling of discomfort (CDC, 
2004e). The initial symptoms may be quite mild and gradually increase in 
intensity, peaking during the second week of the illness. 
Respiratory 
Respiratory complaints often develop 2 to 7 days after illness onset and 
usually include a non-productive cough and dyspnea. Upper respiratory symptoms 
are less common but may develop and include rhinorrhea and sore throat. Most 
SARS patients with laboratory evidence of SARS-Co V disease will develop 
radiographic evidence of pneumonia by day 7-10 of illness and most develop 
lymphopenia (CDC, 2004g). In some cases, the disease progresses to the point 
where there is insufficient oxygen in the blood (Kanof, 2003). Ten to twenty 
percent of SARS patients will require mechanical ventilation to maintain adequate 
oxygen levels in the blood and the CDC estimates that approximately four percent 
ofSARS cases will result in death (CDC, 2003c; Kilpatrick, Stockton LLP, 2003). 
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Fever 
SARS usually begins with a fever, a temperature greater than 100.4° F 
(CDC, 2004e). "The increased body temperature intensifies the effects of 
interferons, inhibits the growth of some microbes, and speeds up body reactions 
that aid repair" (Tortora & Grabowski, 1993, p. 697). 
Other 
Up to 20% of infected persons may develop diarrhea (National Institute of 
Allergy and Infectious Diseases, 2004). Some other symptoms associated with the 
illness include headaches and myalgias prior to or in conjunction with the 
respiratory symptoms (Shapiro & McCauley, 2004). 
One specific life-threatening symptom associated with SARS is acute 
respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS), a medical condition where the lungs are 
unable to function properly due to inflanunation causing fluids to leak into the 
lungs (Medical Library, 2003). A few SARS patients developed ARDS and 
required mechanical ventilation. 
Evaluation and Diagnosis 
Screening History 
The early diagnosis ofSARS relied mostly on the presenting symptoms of 
the person and travel history to locations with known SARS cases. During the 
assessment, OEHNs should be alert for patterns of morbidity among clients, 
family members, and communities. OEHNs need to learn as much information as 
possible about exposure sources. 
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The travel history is extremely important in determining if any viral illness 
could be SARS. It is important for OEHNs to determine ifthere has been travel 
to an area with documented or suspected community transmission of SARS or if 
the client has had close contact with a person who traveled to a SARS area. 
A careful symptom history is also critical to correctly assess a viral illness 
as SARS. The onset of symptoms usually occurs within 10 days of contact with 
an infected individual and includes fever, chills, muscle aches, and a dry cough. 
It is important to determine if the client has had contact with a person with 
a respiratory illness who has traveled to a SARS infected area or a person who is a 
suspect or known case ofSARS. 
Tests 
Because the symptoms of SARS are similar to those of influenza, 
health care workers must have fast and accurate tests to identifY and isolate 
persons with SARS. Currently, there is no definitive test to identify SARS during 
the early phase of the illness and this makes early diagnosis difficult (Kanof, 
2003). SARS-Co V testing should be considered if no alternative diagnosis is 
identified 72 hours after initiation of the clinical evaluation and the client is 
thought to be at high risk for SARS disease. Providers should immediately report 
all positive SARS-Co V test results to the local or state health department. 
Confirmatory testing at an appropriate test site should be arranged through the 
local or state health department. The CDC developed guidelines for the collection 
and transport of specimens for SARS-Co V testing and these are available on the 
CDC website. Negative laboratory results obtained within 21 days of illness do 
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not rule out coronavirus infection. In these cases, an antibody test of a specimen 
obtained more than 21 days after illness begins is needed to determine infection 
(CDC, 2004c). 
Reverse Transcription Polymerase Chain Reaction Test 
The Reverse Transcription Polymerase Chain Reaction Test (RT -RCR) 
test can detect SARS-Co V in clinical specimens, including blood, stool, and nasal 
secretions (Johns Hopkins, 2003). This is a laboratory method for detecting the 
genetic material of an infectious disease agent in specimens from patients. Figure 
2.1 illustrates the clinical SARS cases that were positive using the RT -PCR test 
and shows that this test is most effective from the 1Oth to 20th day after the onset 
of illness using both stool and nasopharyngeal aspirates. 
Serologic Testing 
Serologic testing also can be performed to detect SARS-Co V antibodies 
produced after infection (Johns Hopkins, 2003). This is a laboratory method for 
detecting the presence and/or level of antibodies to an infectious agent in serum 
from an exposed person. 
Viral Culture 
Viral cuhure has been used to detect SARS-Co V. A small sample of 
tissue or fluid that may be infected is placed in a container along with cells in 
which the virus can grow. Changes in cells caused by the virus can then be 
viewed under a microscope (Johns Hopkins, 2003). 
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Figure 2.1 
Clinical SARS% Positive by RT-PCR 
Clinical SARS: % positive by RT -PCR 
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http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/sars/pdf/sarsplanslides diagnostics 103003 .pdf 
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Chest Radiographs 
Chest x-rays show lung infiltrates develop in nearly 100% oflaboratory 
confirmed cases, with 66% of them being abnormal by day three (Srinivasan, 
2003). The infiltrates are initially focal and in the peripheral lower lobes, but 
75% of them progress to involve multiple lobes or both lungs (Srinivasan, 2003). 
Scope of the Problem 
Case reports often provide the first clues in the identification of new 
diseases such as SARS and ultimately lead to epidemiologic investigations. In 
most areas with large SARS outbreaks in 2003, healthcare facilities accounted for 
a large proportion (often> 50%) of cases (CDC, 2003b) (Figure 2.2). In addition 
to healthcare workers who cared for patients, other hospital patients and visitors 
were often affected. Most people with SARS were adults, with those over the age 
of 40 and with chronic diseases at increased risk. 
During the November 1, 2002 to May 14, 2003 outbreak ofSARS, a total 
of7 ,628 SARS cases were reported to WHO from 29 countries; 587 deaths (case-
fatality proportion: 7. 7%) were also reported (MMWR, 2003c ). When the 
diagnosis of exclusion clause was added to the case definition for SARS, the 
numbers of cases changed and the numbers continued to change as knowledge 
grew. 
In the 2003 outbreak, there were 8,098 cases ofSARS worldwide with 774 
deaths with an approximate 9% mortality rate (National Institute of Allergy and 
Infectious Diseases, 2004). Endemic SARS areas include China, Singapore, Hong 
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Figure 2.2 
Total SARS Cases and% Healthcare Workers by Country 
Source: CDC. (2003a). Public Health Guidance for Community-Level 
Preparedness and Response to SARS, Slide 5. 
http://www. cdc. gov/ncidod/sars/pdf7sarsplanslides surveillance 103003 .pdf 
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Kong, and Vietnam (Khare eta!., 2004). Over a two month period, the illness 
spread to more than 25 countries in North America, South America, Europe, and 
Asia (Khare eta!., 2004). The rapidity of the spread of the disease and the high 
levels of morbidity and mortality associated with SARS require healthcare 
providers to be vigilant in their efforts of early recognition of cases. As of July 
11, 2003, the mortality rate for SARS was 10%, but the mortality rate in those 
over age 60 was near 50% (Kanof, 2003). Eight confirmed cases were identified 
in the United States but there were no deaths. 
China 
"SARS is believed to have originated in the Guangdong Province, China in 
mid-November 2002" (Kanof, 2003, p. 3). Early cases of the disease were not 
reported which delayed the identification and treatment of the disease and allowed 
it to spread. WHO received its first official report of an atypical pneumonia 
outbreak in China on February 11, 2003 (Kanof, 2003). The report stated there 
were 305 cases of atypical pneumonia and 5 deaths (Kanof, 2003). SARS was 
transmitted out of China by a physician who became infected while treating 
patients in the province and then traveled to a hotel in Hong Kong, where he 
began suffering flu-like symptoms (Kanof, 2003). After several days, other hotel 
guests became infected with SARS and then began to travel to other countries and 
spread the virus globally (Figure 2.3). From November 2002 until April2003, a 
total of 1,454 clinically confirmed cases and 55 deaths occurred with healthcare 
workers making up 24% of the cases (Xu eta!., 2004). The crude case-fatality 
rate was 3.8% for all ages and 12.7% in those over 65 years of age. The epidemic 
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Figure 2.3 
Effect of Travel and Missed Cases on the SARS Epidemic 
Source: CDC. (2003a). Public Health Guidance for Community- Level 
Preparedness and Response to SARS, Slide 3. 
http://www. cdc. gov/ncidod/sars/pdf/sarsplanslides surveillance 1 03003 .pdf 
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peak occurred in the first half of February with approximately 55 new cases daily 
(Xu et al., 2004). 
Forty healthcare workers in a community hospital in Hong Kong were 
studied by a group of researchers. They looked at records of hospital workers 
infected with SARS between March 25 and May 5, 2003 to determine when and 
where they were infected and what protective measures they had used (Ho, Sung, 
& Chan-Yeung, 2003). They found that during the early weeks of the outbreak, 
8% ofhealthcare assistants, 5% of doctors, and 4% of nurses got SARS, mostly 
from direct contact with SARS patients and while wearing only masks (Ho et al., 
2003). 
Asia 
SARS was first reported in Asia in February 2003. Over the next few 
months the illness spread to more than 24 countries in North America, South 
America, Europe, and other parts of Asia before the outbreak was contained 
(CDC, 2004b). During the SARS outbreak, over $60 billion was lost in Asia 
alone (Srinivasan, 2003). 
Canada 
Canada had the highest prevalence of SARS cases in North America 
(Kanof, 2003). Of the 144 cases in Canada, 73 were healthcare workers (WHO, 
2003b). Nine healthcare workers (HCW) were infected following a difficult 
intubation of a critically ill SARS patient, even though all HCWs reported 
wearing recommended protective equipment (Srinivasan, 2003). Toronto health 
officials had everyone entering a hospital answer a screening questionnaire and 
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have their temperature checked before they could enter. They also established 
SARS assessment clinics, also known as fever clinics, for persons to go to rather 
than to the local hospitals in an attempt to control the outbreak (Kanof, 2003). 
They later designated four hospitals as SARS hospitals and directed all SARS 
patients to go there (Kanof, 2003). 
During the 2003 outbreak, Toronto fielded more than 316,000 hotline 
calls, quarantined 23,000 people, investigated more than 2,000 potential cases, 
confirmed 358 of them as SARS, and suffered 38 deaths (WHO, 2003b). 
United States 
As of July 15, 2003, the U.S. had identified 211 SARS cases in 39 states 
with no related deaths (WHO, 2003a). Of the cases, 175 were classified as 
"suspect" cases and 36 were classified as "probable". Thirty-four of the 36 
"probable" cases contracted SARS through international travel with California 
and New York having the greatest number of cases. Only 8 persons in the U.S. 
had laboratory confirmed evidence ofSARS-CoV infection (Table 2.1) (CDC, 
2004e). 
Trends 
Practitioners were the first to notice trends and patterns of SARS-Co V 
infection from the individual cases that formed a pattern of occurrence in China. 
Several guests from the same hotel became ill with similar symptoms, then 
workers at the same hospital, who had close contact with these patients, became 
ill. 
Data collected during a disease outbreak can be an invaluable source for 
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Table 2.1 
SARS Cases in the United States, Spring 2003 
Source: CDC. (2003a). Public Health Guidance for Community-Level 
Preparedness and Response to SARS, Slide 8. 
http:/ /www.cdc. gov/ncidod/sars/pd£' sarsplanslides surveillance 103003 .pdf 
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recognizing trends in the illness pattern and identifying interventions to minimize 
risk. Healthcare facilities were disproportionately affected by SARS-Co V and 
healthcare workers were among the first and most severely affected groups in 
every large outbreak reported (CDC, 2004e). During the 2003 global outbreaks of 
SARS, infants and children accounted for only a small percentage of SARS cases 
and had a much milder disease and better outcome than aduhs (CDC, 2004e). In 
most instances, SARS outbreaks were localized to specific communities and often 
to specific locations or fucilities in a community. For example, in Canada, most 
SARS cases occurred in Toronto, and in Toronto, most cases occurred in hospitals 
(CDC, 2004a). 
Reoccurrence in 2004 
In China, between December 16, 2003 and January 31, 2004 there were 
four cases ofSARS but no deaths. Between April22 and 29, 2004 there were 
nine new cases with one death (WHO, 2004b). Seven of the patients were from 
Beijing and two were from Anhui Province in east-central China. Two of the nine 
patients were graduate students who worked at the National Institute ofVirology 
Laboratory in Beijing, which is known to conduct research on SARS-Co V. The 
illness was first reported in a postgraduate student The virology lab was closed 
on April23, 2004 and remains closed while the investigation continues (Manning, 
2004). As of May 10, WHO aunounced the outbreak was under control after nine 
persons were confirmed cases and all were linked to the National Institute of 
Virology (Medline Plus, 2004a). WHO has strongly recommended that work 
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using the live SARS virus be conducted in Biosafe facilities to minimize the risk 
oflaboratory-acquired infections (WHO, 2004b). 
While no one knows whether there will be another resurgence ofSARS, 
federal, state, and local healthcare officials agree that it is necessary to prepare for 
the possibility. The chain of transmission is considered broken at an outbreak site 
when 20 days have passed since the last probable case was placed in isolation, left 
the area, or died (WHO, 2003a). The goal of public health is to maximize the 
early detection of cases and clusters of respiratory infections that might signal the 
re-emergence ofSARS-CoV disease. IfSARS recurs, practitioners must maintain 
prompt identification and reporting of potential cases to assure outbreak control. 
They must also identify and monitor contacts of cases to enable early detection of 
illness in persons at risk. Possible sources for reintroduction of SARS in the 
population include animal reservoirs, persistent infection in humans, laboratory 
acquired, and dynamic outbreaks. 
Original Animal Reservoir 
Because its sequence data differ from that of known human coronaviruses, 
SARS-Co V is suspected to have crossed the species barrier between an animal 
host and humans (MMWR, 2003a). Detection ofSARS-like coronavirus had 
been reported previously in masked palm civets (sometimes called civet cats) and 
a raccoon dog for sale in a live animal market (MMWR, 2003a). Approximately 
75% of emerging infectious diseases are zoonotic and evidence suggests an 
animal origin for SARS is possible (Xu et a!., 2004). 
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Healthcare workers, laboratory workers, and people in close contact with 
certain animals are at risk of contracting a range of infectious diseases with 
outbreak potential (WHO, 2004a). A potential source of virus for a recurrence of 
person-to-person spread ofSARS-Co V includes reintroduction to humans from an 
animal reservoir. Since SARS-Co V currently exists in the animals in southern 
China- the apparent source of the 2003 outbreak- this area remains under 
scrutiny for SARS-Co V disease activity. 
Persistent Infection in Humans 
The 2003 global outbreaks demonstrated the ease with which SARS-Co V 
can spread in human populations when cases remain undetected or when infected 
persons are not cared for in controlled environments that reduce the risk of 
transmission to others. A potential source for reoccurrence of person-to-person 
spread of SARS-Co V is persistent infection in previously ill persons. Large cities 
that are international hubs connecting to locales that might harbor persistent 
infections in humans could be sources of reoccurrence. 
Laboratory Acquired 
The Apri12004 cases ofSARS linked to exposures in research laboratories 
have prompted concerns about the role of laboratories as a reservoir for the 
reintroduction ofSARS into the community. Laboratory personnel in facilities 
performing diagnostic tests on patients suspected to be infected with SARS 
should follow biosafety preventive guidelines established by the CDC's Interim 
Laboratory Biosafety Guidelines for Handling and Processing Specimens 
Associated with Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) (WHO, 2004a). 
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They should also follow OSHA's bloodbome pathogens (29 CFR 1910.1 030) and 
respiratory protection standards (29 CFR 1910.134). 
Dynamic Outbreaks 
Communicable and infectious diseases are constantly changing. The 
changes in disease-producing organisms present challenges for heahhcare 
professionals. SARS could recur as a result of changes in the genetic structure of 
the virus which makes it more virulent. 
Management of International Travel-Related Transmission 
The CDC's Public Health Guidance for Community-Level Preparedness 
and Response to SARS, Supplement E: Managing International Travel-Related 
Transmission Risk established the following goals: 
• Prevent the introduction of SARS-Co V into the U.S. from SARS-affected 
areas, 
• Prevent exportation of SARS-Co V from the U.S. if domestic transmission 
presents an increased risk of exportation, 
• Reduce the risk of SARS-Co V disease among outbound travelers to 
SARS-affected areas, and 
• Prevent the transmission of SARS-Co V to passengers on a conveyance 
with a SARS patient, and evaluate and monitor other passengers to detect 
SARS-like illness and prevent further spread (CDC, 2004c). 
Agency/Government Response 
In the U.S., the Healthcare Infection Control Practices Advisory 
Committee (HICP AC), a federal advisory committee made up of 14 infection 
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control experts, develops recommendations and guidelines regarding infectious 
disease control measures for CDC (Kanof, 2003). No new infectious disease 
control measures were introduced in the U.S. to contain the SARS outbreaks. 
Instead, strict adherence to the use of current infection control measures was 
sufficient. The control measures used were case identification, contact tracing, 
transmission control, and exposure management (Kanof, 2003). 
WHO and CDC 
On March 17,2003, WHO asked I !laboratories in 9 countries to form a 
network to discover the etiology of SARS, where all samples were shared among 
the laboratories and any information discovered was posted inunediately on a 
secure site and instantly available to all the others (Srinivasan, 2003). WHO 
issued a global alert for the first time in more than ten years when SARS became 
a global health problem, but cancelled the alert in July 2003 when the outbreak 
was controlled. WHO scheduled numerous press conferences that updated the 
health community about the status of international SARS contaimnent and 
prevention efforts (Kanof, 2003) (Appendix A). WHO, with CDC support, 
sponsored a videoconference broadcast globally to discuss the latest findings of 
the outbreak and prevention of transmission in healthcare settings (Kanof, 2003). 
During a two-week period early in the outbreak, CDC conducted uine telephone 
press conferences with the media to keep the public informed about the latest 
SARS information, laboratory and surveillance findings, travel advisories, and 
CDC's efforts nationally and worldwide (Kanof, 2003). CDC activated its 
Emergency Operations Center and devoted over 800 medical experts and support 
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personnel worldwide to provide round-the-clock coordination and response to the 
SARS outbreak (Kanof, 2003). 
Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists (CSTE) 
During the 2003 epidemic ofSARS, CSTE worked with the CDC to 
develop surveillance criteria to identify persons with SARS (MMWR, 2003a). 
The surveillance case definition changed throughout the epidemic as increased 
knowledge of the clinical, laboratory, and transmission characteristics ofSARS-
CoV became available (MMWR, 2003a). 
On June 26, 2003, CSTE adopted a position statement to add SARS-Co V 
disease to the National Notifiable Disease Surveillance System (NNDSS) 
(MMWR, 2003a). This statement included criteria for defining a SARS case for 
national reporting. On November 3, 2003, CSTE issued an interim position 
statement with a revised SARS case definition. The revised case definition 
modified the clinical, epidemiologic, laboratory, and case-exclusion criteria in the 
U.S. case definition used during the 2003 epidemic. 
Case Definition 
Case identification is the process of determining whether or not a person 
meets the specific definitions for a given disease (Kanof, 2003). The CDC case 
definition has both clinical and epidemiological components. The clinical 
component includes an asymptomatic or mild respiratory illness, a fever greater 
than 38" C (100.4" F), and some findings of respiratory illness such as cough or 
shortness of breath (CDC, 2004a). The epidemiological criteria involve assessing 
the exposure to SARS via travel to areas known to have SARS cases, or through 
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close contact with someone known to or suspected to have the illness (Shapiro & 
McCauley, 2004). 
A "suspect" case ofSARS includes the following criteria: 
• High fever, 
• Respiratory illness, 
• Recent travel to an area with current or previously documented 
suspected transmission ofSARS, and/or 
• Close contact within 10 days of the onset of symptoms with a 
person known or suspected to have SARS (CDC, 2003a). 
A "probable" case ofSARS includes the following criteria: 
• All the criteria for "suspect" cases, and 
• Evidence in the form of chest x-ray fmdings ofpneumonia, acute 
respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS), or an unexplained 
respiratory illness resulting in death with autopsy findings of 
ARDS (CDC, 2003a). 
The final determination of whether cases meeting the definitions for 
"suspect" or "probable" are due to infection with the SARS virus is based on 
results of testing a blood specimen obtained 28 days after the onset of illness 
(CDC, 2003a). 
Clinical Criteria 
The clinical criteria were revised after several months to have "early" 
illness replace "asymptomatic" or "mild" illness (MMWR, 2003d). 
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Epidemiologic Criteria 
The epidemiologic criteria were revised to include the following new 
categories: 1) possible exposure to SARS-Co V and 2) likely exposure to SARS-
Co V (MMWR, 2003d). 
Laboratory Criteria 
The laboratory criteria were revised several times during the course of the 
outbreak to include advances in new testing technology. 
Exclusion Criteria 
These have been revised to allow for exclusion when a serum sample 
collected more than 28 days after onset of symptoms is negative for antibodies to 
SARS-CoV (MMWR, 2003a). 
Surveillance Criteria 
The revised case definition also classifies each SARS case as either a 
SARS report under investigation (SARS RUI) or SARS-Co V disease (MMWR, 
2003b). The SARS RUI is based solely on clinical or epidemiologic criteria and 
includes cases previously classified as probable or suspect. The SARS-Co V 
disease cases are based on selected clinical and epidemiologic criteria plus 
laboratory confirmation (MMWR, 2003b). 
On-Site Investigations 
The CDC deployed medical officers, epidemiologists, and other specialists 
to assist with onsite investigations around the world (CDC, 2004e). They also 
provided assistance to state and local health departments in investigating possible 
cases ofSARS in the U.S. (CDC, 2004e). The New York City health department 
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hosted a symposium specifically for healthcare workers, to share the latest 
available SARS information. Hospital officials offered training seminars for their 
healthcare personnel on the signs and symptoms of SARS, reconnnended 
screening questions, and appropriate infectious disease control measures (Kanof, 
2003). 
The CDC conducted extensive laboratory testing of clinical specimens 
from SARS patients to identify the cause of the disease. SARS diagnostic assays 
are sensitive and specific, but may not provide definitive diagnosis early in the 
illness. Changes in the quantity, type, and timing of specimens collected may 
improve detection ofSARS-CoV infection (CDC, 2004e) (Table 2.2). 
Interpretation of test results must take into consideration the possibility of false 
positives and negatives. 
Health Alert Notices 
The CDC distributed more than two million health alert notices to 
travelers entering the U.S. from China, Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, Vietnam, 
or Toronto (Kanof, 2003). These cards, printed in eight languages, asked 
individuals to monitor their health for at least 10 days and to contact their 
healthcare provider if they exhibited SARS symptoms (Figure 2.4). 
There are three categories of Health Alert messages: 
• Health Alert: conveys the highest level of importance; warrants 
immediate action or attention. 
• Health Advisory: provides important information for a specific 
incident or situation; may not require immediate action (Figure 2.5). 
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Table2.2 
SARS Diagnostics: Specimen Selection and Timing 
1 "3weeks 
post symptom 
onset 
Serum (separator tube) ++ ++ ++ 
Blood plasma (EDTA) ++ + 
Respiratory (BAL, 
sputum, nasal aspirate + ++ + 
& wash, nplop swabs) 
Stool + ++ ++ 
Source: CDC. (2003a). Public Health Guidance for Community-Level 
Preparedness and Response to SARS, Slide 15. 
http:/ /www.cdc. gov/ncidod/sars/pd£1 sarsplanslides diagnostics 1 03 003. pdf 
Figure 2.4 
CDC Health Alert Notice 
HEALTH ALERT NOTICE 
for International Travelers 
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arriving in the United States from areas with SARS 
TO THE TRAVELER: During your recent travel, you may have been near 
people who have a disease called SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome). 
Please follow these steps: 
• Please pay close attention to your health for the next l 0 days. 
• If you get sick with a fever or cough or have trouble breathing, make an 
appointment with a doctor. 
• Before your visit, tell your doctor about your recent travel. This way steps 
can be taken to keep others from getting sick. 
• Save this card and give it to your doctor if you become ill. 
TO THE PHYSICIAN: The patient presenting this card may have recently 
traveled to an area where cases ofSARS have been identified. If you suspect that 
this patient may have SARS, please contact your city, county, or state health 
officer (see http://www.cdc.gov or call the CDC Emergency Operations Center at 
770-488-71 00). 
Source: CDC. (2003a). Public Health Guidance for Community-Level 
Preparedness and Response to SARS. 
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/sars/travel alert.htm 
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Figure 2.5 
CDC Health Advisory 
TRAVELERS ALERT 
HEALTH ADVISORY 
SEVERE ACUTE RESPIRATORY SYNDROME 
(SARS) 
Please notify the ER or clinic personnel immediately 
If you have traveled within the last 10 days from these high 
prevalence areas for SARS 
• Mainland China or Hong Kong 
• Singapore 
• Hanoi, Vietnam 
• Toronto, Canada 
OR 
If you have been in close contact with an individual(s) who have 
been diagnosed as having SARS 
AND 
If you have a fever or respiratory symptoms such as cough or 
shortness of breath. 
Please wear a mask as you enter the area. 
Source: CDC. (2003a). Public Health Guidance for Community-Level 
Preparedness and Response to SARS. 
http :1 lwww. who. int/ csr/ sars/ conference/june 2003/healthadvisory 
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• Health Update: provides updated information regarding an incident or 
situation; unlikely to require immediate action (CDC, 2004e). 
Recommendations and Guidelines 
CDC prepared guidelines for transmission control measures for both 
inpatient (hospitals) and outpatient (such as physician's offices) healthcare 
settings. There is no specific treatment for SARS, therefore, the CDC currently 
recommends that individuals suspected ofhaving SARS be managed the same as 
any person with serious atypical pneumonia (2003a). Mild cases may be managed 
at home while more severe cases will require hospitalization including intravenous 
medication and oxygen supplementation. Ten to twenty per cent of patients will 
require mechanical ventilation (Kanof, 2003). The SARS-specific guidelines 
developed by the CDC will also improve the healthcare system's capacity to 
respond to other infectious disease outbreaks such as influenza. 
Hospital infection control policies related to SARS should be guided by 
the level ofSARS activity in the community and the hospital. The goals of the 
hospital, according to CDC, will include: 
• Rapidly identifY and isolate all potential SARS patients, 
• Implement infection control practices and contact tracing to interrupt 
SARS-Co V transmission, and 
• Ensure rapid communication within healthcare facilities and between 
healthcare facilities and health departments (CDC, 2004b). 
Priority activities for hospitals include: 
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• Organize a planning committee to develop an institutional preparedness 
and response plan and a clear decision-making structure, 
• Develop surveillance, screening, and evaluation strategies for various 
levels ofSARS-CoV transmission, 
• Develop plans to rapidly implement effective infection control measures 
and contact-tracing procedures, 
• Determine the current availability of resources to care for SARS patients 
and strategies for meeting increasing demands, 
• Develop strategies for meeting staffing needs for SARS patient care and 
management, 
• Develop strategies to communicate with staff, patients, health departments 
and the public, and 
• Develop strategies to educate staff and patients about SARS and SARS 
control measures (CDC, 2004b). 
Community containment strategies are basic infectious disease control 
measures. Isolation of SARS patients separates them from healthy persons and 
restricts their movement to prevent transmission to others. It also allows for the 
delivery of specialized healthcare to ill persons. Quarantine of persons who have 
been exposed but who are not ill is intended to prevent further transmission in the 
event that they develop disease. 
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Impacts 
Social and Economic 
The social and economic impact of the SARS outbreak in 2003 was 
tremendous. The cost incurred to determine the identification of the causative 
agent was great and research has been underway since then to expand the 
knowledge base and to discover a vaccine for the virus. WHO and CDC spent 
huge sums of money related to the SARS outbreak. Many staff were committed 
to writing and publishing documents on their web sites so all public health 
practitioners would have the latest information available. CDC also spent large 
sums of money publishing the notices for travelers in eight languages. 
Business and industry felt tremendous impact from the outbreak as travel 
to many areas of the world was restricted and business decisions had to be 
delayed until travel could resume. The healthcare industry was particularly hard 
hit because ofthe increased numbers of staff needed to care for the large numbers 
of sick patients, the number of staff needed for out-patient clinics serving as 
screening fucilities, and the significant number ofhealthcare providers that were 
among the really sick patients. 
The social impact of the SARS outbreak centered around the large 
numbers of people who were either isolated or quarantined in an effort to control 
the spread of the disease. Closing schools, canceling gatherings, and 
implementing other measures for increasing social distance to slow disease 
transmission had an impact on families, workplaces, and entire communities. 
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Occupational Health Concerns/Issues 
There were a number of occupational health concerns and issues related to 
changes in policies and procedures in a number of occupational settings. The big 
concern for worksites was how to provide a safe workplace while continuing to 
do the travel necessary to continue the business relationships with partners in all 
parts of the world. There was also a tremendous need for education and training 
for workers such as healthcare workers, dock/port workers, border patrol and 
customs personnel, airport personnel, business travelers, and laboratory personnel. 
Healthcare Workers 
The large numbers ofhealthcare workers who were infected with SARS 
had profound implications for occupational and environmental health nurses, 
especially those working in hospitals and other healthcare settings (Shapiro & 
McCauley, 2004). Two geographic areas that were affected were Hong Kong, 
where 386 healthcare workers contracted SARS and 8 of them died, and Canada, 
where more than 100 were affected (Shapiro & McCauley, 2004). The high rate 
of infection was likely caused by treatments such as bag-valve-mask ventilation, 
endotracheal intubation, cardiopulmonary resuscitation, and giving aerosolized 
medications without adequate PPE (Shapiro & McCauley, 2004). The disease 
spread rapidly because little information was available to the workers regarding 
the isolation required to contain the disease. As the disease progressed, gowns, 
masks, and gloves were in short supply. This created work force issues, 
especially in Canada, for the healthcare agencies and for the workers who were 
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unable to earn income during the quarantine period. Healthcare workers may 
have experienced a mix of feelings including guilt for possibly exposing their 
families to the disease, isolation, depression, and guilt feelings about missing 
work when they were sick or quarantined. 
Emergency Medical Technicians deal with large numbers of persons who 
have symptoms of fever, headache, and other respiratory symptoms who are not 
infected with SARS. Physical isolation of a SARS infected patient is problematic 
for those in ambulances, although some vehicles have a separate ventilation 
system for the client and driver compartments. Both the driver and the client 
should be wearing respiratory PPE if there is shared ventilation. In Taiwan, of the 
193 emergency department workers exposed to SARS, 4. 7% were infected 
(Chang et al., 2004). Although universal precautions should be strictly followed 
when emergency department staff have contact with patients with a variety of 
symptoms, implementing infection control measures is more difficult in the 
emergency department than on the floors or intensive care units. Persons infected 
with SARS-Co V might present with only a mild febrile illness and minimal 
respiratory illness or be completely free of any clinical symptoms. 
Border Patrol and Customs Personnel 
Border patrol and customs personnel were asked to conduct health 
screening of travelers at posts of entry to prevent the spread of SARS among 
travelers during the SARS outbreak. They distributed SARS Health Alert Notices 
at major ports of entry to arriving passengers from areas known to have SARS 
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cases. These workers must protect themselves from exposure to SARS infected 
persons by utilizing infection control measures. 
Airport Personnel 
During the 2003 outbreak, the CDC and OSHA recommended that flight 
crews traveling to affected areas visit their healthcare providers 4 to 6 weeks 
before traveling to ensure that they were up to date on their shots. Flight crews 
were also advised to avoid large crowds while in affected areas and to wash their 
hands frequently with soap and water or alcohol-based hand rubs. CDC and 
OSHA recommended gloves be worn by airline ground personnel and cleanup 
crews as well as airport security and immigration workers. The CDC also 
recommended use of respirators and protective clothing by employees involved in 
the air transportation ofSARS patients (2003a). Both OSHA and CDC developed 
guidelines that apply to laboratory workers, healthcare workers, and employees 
who handle the human remains of SARS patients. If a passenger is suspected of 
having SARS, providing additional information for crews cleaning that airplane is 
necessary. OSHA advised that personnel follow the recommendations published 
by the CDC, Interim Guidance for Cleaning of Commercial Passenger Aircraft 
Following a Flight with a Passenger with Suspected Severe Acute Respiratory 
Syndrome (SARS) (CDC, 2004f). 
Business Travelers 
Travel to SARS-affected areas creates the greatest health risk to U.S. 
employees. CDC issued a travel advisory recommending travelers postpone any 
nonessential trips to mainland China, Hong Kong, and Singapore during the 2003 
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outbreak. The Department of State warned U.S. residents to defer nonemergency 
travel to China and Vietnam. An interim travel alert was issued advising U.S. 
travelers to Canada to use caution when visiting Toronto. Employers have a legal 
obligation under the OSH Act to take affirmative steps to protect the health of 
employees traveling to SARS-infected areas on business. The OSH Act General 
Duty S(a)(l) Clause requires employers to provide a workplace "free from 
recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical 
harm." Employers can be cited fur violating the General Duty Clause if they do 
not take reasonable steps to abate or address such a recognized hazard as 
employee exposure to an infectious disease such as SARS. 
Screening and evaluating passengers for SARS like symptoms, educating 
them about SARS, and reporting illnesses in travelers can decrease the risk of 
travel-associated infections. 
Laboratory Workers 
After the April2004 reoccurrence ofSARS in China, the CDC sent a letter 
to laboratories that had been mailed live SARS-Co V alerting them to the 
laboratory-acquired infections. The letter reminded laboratories of the need to 
strictly adhere to biosafuty level 3 procedures while working with the virus and 
provided web links to documents that outline laboratory procedures to be 
followed while working with SARS-CoV (CDC, 2004b). 
WHO emphasized that scientists working with SARS virus need to handle 
inactivated material with caution and recommended that: 
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• Researchers use appropriate and internationally accepted methods for 
validating the inactivation of live viruses, 
• Inactivated material be handled only in laboratories at biosafety level 2 
or above, 
• Researchers wear appropriate personal protective equipment, 
• New inactivation methods be adopted only after rigorous testing, and 
• Clear and comprehensive protocols available for inactivation techniques 
(WHO, 2004b). 
Health of Geographic Areas 
The health of an entire geographic area may be impacted by an outbreak 
ofSARS, as was demonstrated in China. The large numbers ofhealthcare 
professionals who became ill and/or died greatly impacted the capacity of the 
system to care for the increasing numbers of infected individuals. 
In the CDC document, In the Absence of SARS-Co V Transmission 
Worldwide: Guidance for Surveillance, early case detection is summarized, 
In the absence of person-to-person transmission of SARS-Co V worldwide, 
the goal of domestic surveillance is to maximize early detection of cases 
of SARS-Co V disease while minimizing unnecessary laboratory testing, 
concerns about SARS-Co V, implementation of control measures, and 
social disruption (2004b, p. 3). 
Communities must have plans in place to control a SARS outbreak such as 
establishment of designated sites for evaluation of possible SARS patients; 
screening of incoming and departing travelers at airports, ports, and border 
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crossings; and quarantine of close contacts of cases or of persons potentially 
exposed to SARS (CDC, 2004e). 
SARS Research 
The National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID), a 
component of the National Institutes of Health, is encouraging grant applications 
on the immunopathology of SARS, including studies on inflammation and airway 
hypersensitivity (2004). NIAID scientists have developed a mouse model of 
SARS which will allow the study of both the course ofSARS infection and 
potential vaccines against the disease. NIAID is participating in a project to 
screen up to 100,000 antiviral drugs and other compounds, such as alpha 
interferon, for activity against SARS-Co V (2004). 
In 2003, NIAID awarded contracts to Baxter Heaithcare and Aventis 
Pasteur to produce experimental inactivated whole virus SARS vaccines. Once 
these vaccines are ready, clinical trials will be conducted. Scientists at NIAID's 
Vaccine Research Center in Bethesda, MD have developed an experimental 
SARS vaccine that prevents the SARS-Co V from replicating in laboratory mice. 
They are seeking the Food and Drug Administration approval to begin safety and 
immunology studies in people. NIAID and foreign scientists are collaborating to 
develop and test a variety of vaccines including standard killed virus vaccines and 
molecularly designed vaccines. 
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CHAPTER3 
EXPOSURE MANAGEMENT AT WORKSITES 
Exposure management is the separation of infected persons from 
noninfected persons. This may be managed utilizing a number of techniques 
including surveillance, infection control, isolation, quarantine, preparedness plans, 
and communication. 
Surveillance 
"Surveillance, as defined by CDC and the CSTE, is an ongoing systematic 
collection, analysis, and interpretation of health data essential to the planning, 
implementation, and evaluation of public health practice and dissemination of 
information" (Rogers, 2003, p. 305). Decision makers need guidance for 
developing and implementing the best strategies for disease prevention and 
control programs. 
The goals of surveillance are to maximize early detection of cases and 
clusters of respiratory infections that might signal the global re-emergence of 
SARS-Co V disease; maintain prompt and complete identification and reporting of 
potential cases to fucilitate outbreak control; and identifY and monitor contacts of 
cases ofSARS-Co V disease to enable early detection of illness in persons at 
greatest risk (CDC, 2004e). 
Lessons learned from the 2003 outbreaks have identified three features of 
SARS-Co V disease that can determine surveillance activities during periods when 
there are no worldwide transmission outbreaks: 
• Most infected patients develop radiographic evidence of pneumonia. 
SARS 40 
• Most transmission occurs when patients are seriously ill and hospitalized. 
• Most infected patients have an identifiable exposure source to a known 
SARS case or a location with known SARS cases (CDC, 2004d). 
Surveillance then, should be aimed at identifYing patients who require 
hospitalization for pneumonia or acute respiratory distress syndrome without 
identifiable etiology, and who have risk fuctors in the 10 days before the onset of 
illness that include: travel to mainland China, Hong Kong, or Taiwan or close 
contact with someone traveling to these areas or are part of a cluster of cases of 
atypical pneumonia (CDC, 2004d). Hospital infection control nurses and other 
healthcare personnel should be alert for clusters of pneumonia among two or more 
healthcare workers from the same facility (CDC, 2004d). 
Public health officials and healthcare providers need to be informed about 
any changes of existing infectious disease control measures, the geographic 
progressions of an outbreak, and reports of disease occurrence (Kanof, 2003). 
Educating the public about an infectious disease and its symptoms will allow 
infected persons to seek medical attention as soon as possible to contain the 
spread. The news media can communicate to the public through government 
publications, direct inquiry, and by targeting sub-sets of the population such as 
groups or associated businesses or vocations (CDC, 2003b). 
Rapid Identification oflnfected Persons 
During the 2003 SARS outbreak, healthcare providers identified cases by 
screening persons for fever, cough, and recent travel to a country with active 
cases of SARS. Public health officials worked to identifY every person who 
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might have been infected with the disease. The Jack of an effective and timely 
diagnostic test during the early stages of the disease outbreak was an obstacle in 
halting its spread. The incubation period ofSARS helped U.S. healthcare 
workers to identifY cases and close contacts of cases before those who actually 
had the SARS virus could spread the disease to others (Kanof, 2003). During the 
2003 outbreak, hospital emergency room and other waiting room staff used 
questionnaires to screen incoming patients for fever, cough, and travel to a 
country with active cases of SARS. Individuals were asked to identifY themselves 
to hospital staff if they met these criteria. A person identified as a potential SARS 
case was given a surgical mask and moved into a separate area for further 
evaluation. All healthcare workers should be empowered to initiate effective 
measures to protect themselves and others from potentially contagious diseases. 
This means that healthcare workers should be aware of potential clinical and 
epidemiological risk factors; have ready access to the equipment and knowledge 
needed to protect themselves and others; and be allowed to initiate the most 
appropriate infection-control measures innnediately (WHO, 2004a). 
Pneumonia Clusters 
Quickly identifYing possible clusters of respiratory illness is important in 
the control and detection of new or rare infectious diseases such as SARS (WHO, 
2004a). Healthcare professionals need to consider SARS-Co V disease in patients 
who require hospitalization for radiographically confrrmed pneumonia of 
unknown etiology and who have one of the following risk factors in the 10 days 
before illness onset: 
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1. Travel to mainland China, Hong Kong or Taiwan, or close contact 
with an ill person with a history of recent travel to one of these 
areas, or 
2. Employment in an occupation associated with a risk for SARS-
Co V exposure, or 
3. Part of a cluster of cases of atypical pneumonia without an 
alternative diagnosis (CDC, 2004e). 
To assist healthcare providers working in fever clinics and emergency 
departments during the SARS outbreak, who routinely worked in other areas of 
healthcare, many hospitals developed treatment algorithms (Figure 3.1 ). 
Mechanisms for information exchange such as this is essential during an 
infectious disease outbreak. 
Infection Control Measures 
Healthcare personnel in the workplace will also need to take infection 
control measures. These measures fall into three categories: standard, contact, 
and airborne (Khare eta!., 2004). 
• Standard precautions include hand washing with soap and water or 
alcohol-based cleansers and eye protection. 
• Contact precautions consist of wearing a gown and gloves when 
contacting the employee and the employee's surroundings. 
• Airborne precautions include placing the employee in an isolated, 
negative-pressure room and wearing an N-95 respirator. 
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Figure 3.1 
Draft-Algorithm to Work Up and Isolate Symptomatic Persons Who May Have 
Been Exposed to SARS 
Source: CDC. (2003a). Public Health Guidance for Community-Level 
Preparedness and Response to SARS. 
http:! /www. cdc. gov /ncidod/ sars/pdf/ sarshealthcareprep oct2003. pdf 
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WHO suggests that any medical equipment (i.e., stethoscope) with which a 
SARS patient has had contact also has the potential to transmit infection, and thus 
recommends cleaning these with disinfectant solutions (Khare et al., 2004). If 
there is a high index of suspicion for SARS disease, the patient should 
immediately be placed on SARS isolation precautions and all contacts ofthe ill 
patient should be identified, evaluated, and monitored. 
Employers should consider the risk of workplace transmission of SARS by 
individuals who have recently traveled to SARS-infected areas or have had 
contact with a SARS patient. Employees who have had such contact and develop 
symptoms should be excluded from duty while fever and respiratory symptoms 
are present and for 10 days after symptoms disappear. 
Hand Washing 
Transmission control measures for SARS include contact precautions, 
especially hand washing after contact with someone who is sick. Hand washing 
must be done after each client contact and before the next client contact as well. 
Hands should be cleansed before putting on gloves, when removing gloves, and 
before each client contact. 
Ventilation 
Control of exposure is accomplished through the application of industrial 
hygiene principles such as ventilation approaches using high efficiency particulate 
aerosol (HEPA) filters. Primary containment of droplets containing SARS-Co V 
help prevent transmission in air. 
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It is important for hospitals to identifY the best location in the hospital to 
establish a SARS unit in which patients and staff caring for them can be located 
(CDC, 2004g). Ideally this unit will have an air-handling system that allows the 
unit to be negative pressure to surrounding areas and allows for a pressure 
gradient with air flow from the "cleanest" (nurses area) to the "least clean" 
(patient room) areas (CDC, 2004g). 
WHO recognizes that negative-pressure rooms are not always available in 
hospitals and almost never available at industrial sites. WHO suggests the 
following alternate isolation techniques in descending order: (1) single room with 
its own bathroom, (2) cohort placement in an area with an independent air supply, 
exhaust system, and bathroom facilities, or (3) place employee in a room in which 
the air conditioning can be turned off and the windows opened to a non-public 
area (Khare eta!., 2004). Individuals suspected of having SARS should be placed 
in a negative pressure room as soon as possible after arriving at the facility. 
Contact Tracing 
Contact tracing is important in determining who is at risk for developing 
SARS. It is the identification and tracking of persons who have had close contact 
with someone who is infected or suspected of being infected with SARS-Co V. 
Healthcare workers need to be aware of the importance of asking about the health 
of close contacts of anyone with a potentially contagious respiratory illness. 
The process of contact tracing is labor intensive and time consuming. 
Standardized forms, electronic contact, and case databases help the nursing staff 
manage contact tracing. Weekly meetings with staff from other hospital and 
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health department units ensure assistance is available if needed and everyone is 
up-to-date on information. Procedure manuals were developed in New York City 
to allow staff from other departments to be trained quickly if needed to assist 
members of the communicable disease department (Kanof, 2003). 
Isolation and Quarantine 
Exposure management practices such as isolation and quarantine were 
used in both heahhcare and home settings to contain the SARS outbreak. In the 
U.S., the President signed an executive order on April4, 2003, adding SARS to 
the list of quarantinable diseases (Appendix B). Tbis executive order provides 
CDC with the legal authority to implement isolation and quarantine measures for 
SARS as part of its transmissible disease control measures (CDC, 2004f). The 
CDC's Division of Global Migration and Quarantine works with federal agencies, 
state and local health departments, the travel industry, and other organizations to 
prevent the introduction of communicable disease into the U.S. CDC has eight 
fully staffed quarantine stations that are part of the United States Public Health 
Service (USPHS) (CDC, 2004e). In North Carolina, local health directors and the 
state health director are empowered to exercise isolation and quarantine authority 
G.S. 130A-145. "Isolation authority" is the authority to limit the freedom of 
movement or action of a person or animal who actually has a communicable 
disease or condition G.S. 130A-2(3a). "Quarantine authority" most often refers to 
the authority to limit the freedom of movement or action of a person or animal 
that has been exposed to a communicable disease or condition, or to limit the 
freedom of movement or action ofunimmunized persons during an outbreak G.S. 
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130A-2(7a). Quarantine and isolation orders cannot exceed 10 days. During the 
SARS outbreak in 2003, North Carolina did not need this legal authority but the 
measures were reviewed and ready for use if needed. 
During the March- July 2003 outbreak ofSARS, approximately 30,000 
Beijing residents were quarantined in their homes or specified sites to control the 
epidemic (Li, Zeng, & Ou, 2003). When quarantine is used as part of a 
comprehensive SARS-control program, it should ouly be used for persons who 
have contact with an actively ill SARS patient in the home or hospital. If these 
guidelines had been used in China, the quarantine measures would have been 
reduced by 66% and this would have reduced resources expended for quarantine 
(Li, et a!., 2003). 
By the end of the SARS epidemic in Taiwan in 2003, 131,132 persons had 
been placed in quarantine, including 50,310 close contacts of SARS patients and 
80,813 travelers from WHO-designated SARS-affected areas (MMWR, 2003d). 
Exposure Reduction 
During the 2003 SARS outbreak in China, many schools, daycares, and 
workplaces other than hospitals had to be closed for days and weeks due to the 
widespread nature of the disease. In Toronto, there was also closure of some 
schools and some floors ofhospitals as well as clinics due to the large numbers of 
people affected by the outbreak. 
During outbreaks of infectious diseases such as the SARS outbreak in 
2003, it is often in the best interest of the public to cancel large gatherings of 
people such as concerts, ballgames, etc. because of the close personal contact that 
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these events cause and the likelihood of disease transmission. The SARS 
outbreak did result in many events being cancelled or rescheduled in China, 
Singapore, and Toronto. Non-essential workers were also asked to stay home 
from work. 
If an employee has been diagnosed with SARS but is not hospitalized, the 
person still must not be allowed to return to the workplace because of the risk of 
transmission. The CDC suggests that even after the fever and other symptoms 
have resolved, the recovering employee should remain at home for at least 10 
days (Khare et al., 2004). 
Preparedness 
Although SARS is not considered a traditional occupational disease, 
physicians and other healthcare workers practicing in occupational health settings 
may be the :frrst healthcare professional with whom an individual with SARS 
comes in contact. It is important for all employers to have a SARS protocol for 
the workplace. 
A consideration for SARS preparedness planning is the rapid 
identification ofSARS cases and implementation of control measures (CDC, 
2003a). Other important aspects are training, education, and information 
available to guide the public, public health professionals, clinicians, and 
healthcare communities to respond appropriately. Professionals in the area must 
also be educated including :frrst responders, public safety professionals such as 
police, and even political leaders. The quality of the communications is very 
important. They must be accurate, science based, timely, comprehensible, 
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appropriately targeted, credible, and coordinated from a central point (CDC, 
2003a). 
It is important for each hospital, industrial site, government agency, and 
country to have written policies and procedures to follow in case another outbreak 
of SARS occurs. These written plans will outline the lines of authority and the 
responsibilities of each department or entity. Written policies and procedures will 
assure that the outbreak is quickly contained with much less impact than occurred 
with the 2003 outbreak. 
The United States Government Interagency SARS Concept of Operations 
Plan (CONPLAN) outlines the Federal government's strategy for a timely, 
coordinated response by federal agencies to a SARS emergency and serves as the 
foundation for the development of operational plans and procedures at the local, 
state, and national levels (CDC, 2004c). Implementing the plan during an 
outbreak may be difficult due to limitations in both hospital and workforce 
capacity that could result in overcrowding as well as shortages in healthcare 
workers and medical equipment, particularly respirators. 
The document is divided into four levels of increasingly detailed 
information: executive summary, core plan, stand-alone supplements that address 
the key measures for SARS preparedness and response, and appendices to each 
supplement that provide guidance and tools for local-level preparedness (CDC, 
2004c). The document provides guidance on each of the following key 
components ofSARS preparedness and response (CDC, 2004c): 
• Command and control, 
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• Surveillance and information technology, 
• Preparedness and response in healthcare fucilities, 
• Community containment measures, including non-hospital 
isolation and quarantine, 
• Management of international travel-related transmission risk, 
• Laboratory diagnostics, 
• Communication and education, 
• SARS investigations and epidemiologic research, and 
• Infection contro 1. 
CDC Website 
The CDC has maintained a website to communicate information since the 
early days of the SARS outbreak. The purpose of the information sharing is to 
instill and maintain the public confidence, contribute to order, minimize irrational 
fear or panic, facilitate public protection and mitigate stigma against individuals 
or groups (CDC, 2003b). The CDC facilitates public protection by providing 
consistent, comprehensible information that addresses information needs at all 
levels and clarifies inaccuracies, rumors, and rnisperceptions. The information on 
the CDC website provides clear guidance for minimizing personal risk and timely 
implementation of infection control measures including personal protection 
practices. CDC's Public Health Guidance for Community-Level Preparedness 
and Response to SARS (2003a) outlines an approach to assist public health 
officials in preparing for and responding quickly to the appearance of SARS-Co V 
in a community. 
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CDC assembled its SARS Preparedness Committee to prepare for the 
possibility of future SARS outbreaks. The Committee included eight working 
groups, each of which addressed a component of SARS preparedness and 
response: Surveillance, Clinical Management, Preparedness in Healthcare 
Facilities, Community Response, Laboratory Diagnostics, Information 
Technology, Communication and Education, and Special Studies (CDC, 2004b). 
The Committee prepared the document Public Health Guidance for Community-
Level Preparedness and Response to SARS, which is posted on the CDC website. 
Communication 
The state/local communications plan must be ready to meet the 
communication needs during a SARS outbreak. An inventory of communications 
resources must be done to determine what printing or graphic design contracts are 
needed, the availability of cell phones, laptops, etc., and the surge capacity for 
hotlines and web servers. The status of the media relations must be considered 
along with the number of trained personnel. 
The goal is to instill and maintain public confidence in the nation's public 
health system and its ability to respond to and manage the reappearance of SARS-
Co V. Communication with the public will contribute to the maintenance of order, 
minimization of public panic and fear, and fucilitation of public protection 
through the provision of accurate, rapid, and complete information before, during, 
and after a SARS outbreak. Another goal of communication is to address rumors 
and misperceptions as quickly as possible. 
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Education 
The CDC provided guidance for persons traveling to areas where SARS 
cases had been reported. The following instructions were provided to travelers 
before they leave home. 
• Assemble a travel health kit containing basic first aid and medical 
supplies. Be sure to include alcohol-based hand rub for hand 
hygiene. 
• Inform yourself and others who may be traveling with you about 
SARS. Information about SARS is provided on CDC's SARS 
website www.cdc.gov/sars/. 
• Be sure you are up to date with all of your shots, and see your 
healthcare provider at least 4-6 weeks before travel to get any 
additional shots or information you may need. Information on 
CDC's health recommendations for international travel is provided 
on CDC's Travelers Health website www.cdc.gov/travel/. 
• You may wish to check your health insurance plan or get 
additional insurance that covers medical evacuation in the event of 
illness. Information about medical evacuation services is provided 
on the website of the U.S. Department of State 
www.travel.state.gov/medical.html. 
• Identify in-country healthcare resources in advance of your trip 
(CDC, 2004±). 
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Other guidance was given if the traveler visited an area where SARS cases have 
been reported. 
• As with other infectious illnesses, one of the most important and 
appropriate preventive practices is careful and frequent hand 
washing. Cleaning your hands often using either soap and water or 
a waterless, alcohol-based hand rub removes potentially infectious 
materials from your skin and helps prevent disease transmission. 
• To minimize the possibility of infection, observe precautions to 
safeguard your health. Tills includes avoiding settings where 
SARS is most likely to be transmitted, such as healthcare fucilities 
caring for SARS patients (CDC, 2004f). 
Collaboration 
Collaboration between federal, state, and local health agencies as well as 
the medical community was crucial to containing the spread of SARS. Through 
the collaboration of all the appropriate players, coordination of prevention 
activities could be maintained, roles could be identified and assigned, available 
resources could be shared, and subsequent evaluations could be conducted 
(Kanof, 2003). In the United States, the Department of Health and Human 
Services (DHHS) is the government's lead agency for the preparation, planning, 
and response to a SARS outbreak. As part ofDHHS, the CDC has primary 
responsibility for tracking a SARS outbreak and managing the operational aspects 
of the public health response. The CDC will assist local and state resources for 
disease surveillance, epidemiologic response, diagnostic laboratory services, 
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education and communication, and disease containment and control (CDC, 
2004 f). The public health workforce consists of state and community agencies 
along with international agencies such as WHO and some nongovernmental 
agencies and organizations including professional societies, colleges, academic 
collaborators, and advocacy groups. 
Dissemination of Information 
The New York City and California Health Departments used e-mail health 
alert notices to inform private physicians about case identification procedures 
(Kanof, 2003). These notices directed physicians to information posted on the 
health departments' web sites. The health departments also provided information 
during meetings of the medical community. Physicians and other primary care 
givers needed advice on diagnostics, therapy, infection control precautions, and 
case management. Hospital administrators and infection control specialists 
needed education on infection control, engineering controls, and policies and 
procedure to institute. Healthcare workers needed education on infection control 
practices as well. Hospitals and clinics posted information for patients to read as 
soon as they arrived with instructions on how to proceed. 
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CHAPTER IV 
ROLE OF OCCUPATIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH 
NURSES 
Prevention of the spread of SARS during a global outbreak is 
challenging for all public health practitioners, including occupational and 
environmental health nurses. In the workplace, OEHNs may be the first 
healthcare professional contacted by an individual exposed to the SARS virus. 
They must know the risk factors and signs and symptoms of SARS to make a 
nursing diagnosis and refer as needed. Because early recognition with appropriate 
treatment is the most powerful tool in preventing death, occupational and 
environmental health nurses are on the front line. Due to the virulence and short 
incubation period of this pathogen, SARS-Co V can potentially affect a large 
populated area in just a few days. The employee health departments in hospitals 
are particularly challenged to prevent spread within the clinical areas and must 
collaborate with area health departments and physicians to contain an outbreak 
quickly. 
Assessment 
During influenza season, occupational and environmental health nurses 
are faced with the task of evaluating clients with influenza-like symptoms and 
deciding when to refer the client for further evaluation. Recording a careful 
history is essential because SARS may appear similar to many systemic illnesses 
such as influenza. Knowledge of risk factors, occupational exposures, recent 
travel, and other health history can help in evaluation. Often clients may not 
SARS 56 
share information they do not think important. Therefore, a history must 
incorporate investigative inquiry to capture essential information. 
Planning 
OEHNs must be involved in the planning phase of the hospital or 
industrial site's response to an outbreak ofSARS in the area. The plan must be 
written and must address all aspects of infectious disease control. OEHNs will 
spend a good amount of time coordinating the efforts of the various disciplines of 
public health during the planning phase and when a SARS outbreak occurs. 
OEHNs can bring together the ideas and concerns of safety, industrial hygiene, 
and administration to plan for a SARS outbreak. 
Policy 
A number of policy issues will need to be resolved during the planning 
phase and during the outbreak as well. Some of the issues concern return to work 
after travel to areas with active SARS cases, business travel being cancelled into 
areas with active SARS cases, and absence from work due to quarantine when 
family members are sick and employees have been exposed. 
Budget 
The budget for an industrial site or a hospital facility must allow for the 
extra expenses that will be incurred with an outbreak ofSARS or any other 
emerging infectious disease. The SARS outbreak was very costly in some areas 
because of the need to purchase large quantities of masks and respiratory 
protection for patients, family members, and staff members. Because these items 
were in short supply, the price escalated quickly. 
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Staff 
During an outbreak such as SARS, the strain placed on hospital staff was 
enormous. As more and more healthcare workers became sick, there were less 
and less workers to provide care. This resulted in hours of overtime for some 
healthcare workers. Staff had to be flexible and willing to transfer to departments 
in hospitals where the needs for staffmg were greatest. Staff also had to be 
willing to work in areas in which they were less trained and care for those 
patients. This same scenario could occur in an industrial setting if an outbreak 
occurred where workers would need to operate pieces of machinery they were not 
accustomed to or work on a shift they were not normally assigned. This 
emphasizes the need for some cross-training in industry. 
Training/Education 
All employees with potential exposure should receive training. Training 
should cover hazards and protocols at the worksite to reduce exposures. The 
safety training that is conducted annually must include training on disease 
transmission and measures to protect against infectious diseases should there be 
an outbreak. Proper hand washing technique must be taught since it is a primary 
control measure for infectious diseases. 
OEHNs must be well prepared and current with continuing education 
training to be able to prepare for and deal with an outbreak of an infectious 
disease. They must be familiar with concepts in industrial hygiene, safety, 
occupational health, loss prevention, toxicology, epidemiology, case management, 
human behavior and motivation, and research and statistics (Rogers, 2003). 
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OEHNs must also be educated and trained on the presenting symptoms of 
the infectious disease, such as SARS, and on routes of transmission. They also 
must be educated regarding the CDC guidelines for the disease and how to obtain 
the latest information and statistics for the disease. OEHNs must also be educated 
on the proper reporting protocol for infectious diseases. 
Worksite Assessment/Analysis 
SARS infections do not necessarily arise "out of and in the course of 
employment," but many SARS cases have been work-related such as those 
occurring among laboratory technicians working with the virus (Khare et al., 
2004). It is important for healthcare workers in occupational health settings to be 
familiar with the criteria for identifYing potential SARS cases. OEHNs, safety 
specialists, and industrial engineers should perform a workplace assessment to 
identifY rooms that have negative pressure or rooms that could be used to hold a 
SARS infected employee until he/she could be transferred to another facility or 
sent home. 
Documentation 
Early identification of an employee with SARS in the workplace is very 
critical for management of the symptoms and control of disease transmission. 
However, SARS should be considered as a possibility only if the employee's 
symptoms meet the case definition of the CDC and WHO. SARS was added to 
the list of reported diseases in June 2003 and all healthcare workers must know 
how to properly report the disease both internally within their particular 
organization and externally to the proper authorities. Communication is important 
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to assure OEHNs in other nearby settings are aware of the levels of exposure and 
infection among workers in the area. 
If the employee has mild respiratory symptoms with a temperature less 
than 100.4° F, but has recently traveled to an endemic area for SARS or had 
contact with a SARS patient, then the employee should be considered a potential 
case and considered as "possible SARS" (Khare et a!., 2004). Unnecessary 
contacts between the "possible SARS" infected person and others in the 
workplace must be avoided. 
The employee must be transferred to a healthcare facility for initiation of 
care without delay. The appropriate county and/or emergency department 
personnel should be notified (Khare et al., 2004). Workers who experience 
symptoms of SARS should be excluded from duty and referred to a healthcare 
provider. 
Control Measures 
It is important for OEHNs to have an outline of the control measures to 
use during an outbreak including engineering, administrative, environmental, and 
personal protective equipment. The rapid institution of the control measures may 
mean the difference between a single case of SARS and an outbreak in a facility. 
Engineering 
Engineering controls are designed to reduce employee exposure in the 
workplace by either removing or isolating the hazard or isolating the worker from 
exposure (Rogers, 2003). Resuscitation equipment, ventilation devices, and 
negative pressure rooms are all examples of engineering controls for SARS. 
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Administrative 
Under the right circumstances, employers should consider asking 
employees and other individuals in the workplace to disclose nonbusiness travel 
to SARS-affected areas or contact with SARS patients. Employees may be 
allowed to work from home or required to remain away from work for ten days 
after returning from a SARS-affected area or after exposure to a SARS patient. 
Employee fears regarding SARS, particularly in workplaces with employees who 
have been exposed to the virus or who have traveled to SARS-infected areas, may 
result in attendance issues that can be combated with training regarding the 
illness. Employers must use caution however, to avoid violating one of the 
federal or state employment laws, particularly those governing the use of 
employee health information and prohibiting discrimination on the basis of 
perceived disability. Wage and hour laws may also present issues for employers 
who prohibit employees return to work after travel to SARS-infected areas. 
Environmental 
The employee should be placed in isolation, preferably a negative-pressure 
room, but if not available, then in a place separate from other employees. Having 
hand washing facilities readily available for employees along with antiseptic 
towelettes help to eliminate or minimize employee exposure. 
Personal Protective Equipment 
When there is occupational exposure, appropriate personal protective 
equipment such as gloves, gowns, aprons, masks, and eye protection will be 
provided to the employee. The employee's mouth and nose should be covered by 
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an N-95 mask. If this type mask is not available, then a surgical mask may be 
used (CDC, 2004h). Masks must be fitted to the individual, used and removed 
properly, and discarded after single use. Eye protection is an essential component 
of the PPE with SARS. OEHNs must monitor and enforce the use of personal 
protective equipment by employees. 
Implementation 
This includes maintaining the most current guidelines for managing SARS 
infections in the workplace. The guidelines address individual worker 
responsibility for monitoring and reporting. OEHNs should bookmark the CDC 
website for Public Health Guidance for Community-Level Preparedness and 
Response to SARS as this documents the lessons learned from the 2002-2003 
outbreak and gives steps for implementing suggested practices (CDC, 2003a). It 
includes legal considerations, communications, laboratory functions, and other 
information for a community response. 
It is important for OEHNs to have the current case definition of SARS and 
be aware of the prevalence of the disease both worldwide and in the community. 
OEHNs should be involved in educating and training workers within healthcare 
settings and industries to clarifY the risks of infections if SARS reemerges. 
OEHNs must be familiar with the presenting signs and symptoms of 
SARS, have excellent assessment skills, be able to quickly establish a relationship 
with the client and begin gathering data. OEHNs working in healthcare facilities 
need to track those staff members who may have been exposed to SARS-Co V 
through either a breach of infection control precautions or through unprotected 
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exposure during activities such as administration of aerosol respiratory treatment, 
emergency intubation, or bag-valve-mask resuscitation (Shapiro & McCauley, 
2004). These employees need to be instructed to monitor their temperature twice 
daily for 10 days. Symptomatic workers in all settings should not return to work 
until! 0 days after fever resolves, the respiratory symptoms have resolved, and 
full medical clearance is obtained (Shapiro & McCauley, 2004). 
The co-workers of sick employees may need to be referred to the 
Employee Assistance Program or other counseling services to be able to resolve 
interpersonal or situational problems that have arisen and may be nonoccupational 
in origin. The issues may affect both the employees and their family members 
during an outbreak. Many employees may need to learn coping strategies to deal 
with the high stress levels created by a disease process in a family member. If 
isolation or quarantine were necessary, then counseling may be needed for 
employees to deal with feelings associated with those measures. There is always 
a need for counseling when a fumily member dies as a result of illness. 
Triage 
The level of surveillance and monitoring that occurred in Toronto during 
the SARS outbreak required as many as 1,800 individuals to be screened and 
triaged in one day (Shapiro & McCauley, 2004). This created a logistical 
nightmare for the staff. Possibly exposed workers in most settings may continue 
to work if they are afebrile, but healthcare workers with high risk exposures 
should not be permitted in any healthcare setting for 10 days following exposure 
(Shapiro & McCauley, 2004). 
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Procedures 
Procedures must be written during the planning phase and then carefully 
followed during the outbreak phase. OEHNs in management positions must be 
involved in establishing procedures for the occupational health unit. "Procedures 
defme specific actions to be taken to standardize the work and increase 
productivity" (Rogers, 2003, p. 489). Procedures should be dated, written in a 
consistent format that considers defmition, purpose, materials/equipment, steps in 
the procedure, and documentation (Rogers, 2003). An example of a procedure 
related to a SARS patient is collection ofbiological specimens for testing. 
Evaluation 
Follow-up evaluations of the plan and implementation of the plan after an 
outbreak is over are crucial to improving the process. Follow-up evaluations of 
hospitals following the 2003 outbreak revealed they needed additional equipment 
and capital improvements including medical stockpiles, personal protective 
equipment, quarantine and isolation facilities, and handling and filtering 
equipment to enhance preparedness (Kanof, 2003). According to a survey of over 
2000 hospitals, few have the equipment and supplies needed to handle a large-
scale infectious disease outbreak (Kanof, 2003). Workforce capacity issues may 
also hinder implementation of infectious disease control measures since there is a 
lack of qualified and trained personnel, including epidemiologists. 
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CHAPTERV 
CONCLUSIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS 
During the 2003 outbreak there were a number of problems and lessons to 
be learned. Several affected areas had difficulty in providing necessary resources 
such as food, medicines, masks, and thermometers to individuals under isolation 
or quarantine. Many lessons were learned that could be helpful to the U.S. in the 
event of a resurgence of SARS. 
Public health professionals, and particularly occupational and 
environmental health nurses, learned the importance of early identification of 
infected persons and their contacts to prevent an outbreak of an infectious disease 
such as SARS. They also realized how important it is to stay current regarding 
emerging infectious diseases and their early recognition and control. The 
effectiveness of safety precautions to control transmission and ensure the 
protection ofhealthcare workers was very evident in hospitals and clinics where 
infected clients were treated without staff becoming infected. OEHNs also 
learned that isolation and sometimes quarantine were necessary to contain 
emerging infectious diseases. 
The workplace assessment and emergency preparedness plan are vital tools 
for OEHNs and the team of professionals charged with providing a safe and 
healthy workplace. It is critical that the entire plan and individual policies and 
procedures be reviewed annually to be certain that the worksite is ready to deal 
with an infectious disease outbreak such as SARS. 
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The SARS outbreak brought the healthcare professionals to the reality that 
there are implications for practice as well as research opportunities regarding 
emerging infectious diseases. Worldwide disease surveillance would facilitate 
prompt identification of a resurgence of SARS, allowing rapid implementation of 
infectious disease control measures that would reduce both the spread ofSARS 
and the risk of a large outbreak (Kanof, 2003). 
Future Research 
As more is learned about the actions ofSARS-CoV, it will be possible to 
design vaccines to prevent the disease. One such project is developing an "entry 
inhibitor" that prevents SARS-Co V from infecting human cells. The National 
Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) is funding development of 
humanized antibodies against SARS-Co V in hopes that they could be used to 
prevent infection from gaining hold in healthcare workers (2004). In 2003, 
NIAID awarded contracts to Baxter Healthcare and Aventis Pasteur to produce 
experimental vaccines (2004). Scientists have already developed a SARS vaccine 
that prevents the SARS-Co V from replicating in laboratory mice (National 
Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, 2004). Researchers from the NIAID 
have found that an experimental vaccine, based on a piece of the SARS virus 
protein, protects mice from SARS infection (National Institutes of Health, 2004). 
WHO will be working with expert groups to develop country and regional 
strategies to strengthen biosafety including: 
• A containment policy to reduce the number oflaboratories storing and 
working with SARS coronavirus, 
SARS 66 
• A legislative body to assist in the development, implementation, and 
evaluation of a national biosafety program and in the investigation of 
biohazard incidents and the dissemination oflessons learned to the 
global scientific community, 
• A laboratory accreditation system based on standardized biosafety 
criteria, 
• An occupational health service to monitor the well-being oflaboratory 
workers, and 
• Comprehensive biosafety and training programs in all diagnostic and 
research institutes (WHO, 2004a). 
Swift communication among healthcare workers, public health officials, 
government agencies, as well as the public is necessary to contain an infectious 
disease. State and local health departments are enhancing existing surveillance 
systems and developing new systems to better detect outbreaks through public 
health surveillance. 
Dr. Mike Magee summed up the SARS outbreak for Health Politics in the 
following words, 
"SARS spread because it was initially unrecognized, not because it was 
untreatable or impossible to contain. Once it was recognized, infection 
control measures worked to contain it. The infection control strategies 
included: aggressive pursuit of contacts, shutting down the sources, 
quarantining potential future cases, and effectively interfacing public health 
specialty teams with clinical hospital leadership. For the future, we now 
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know that team readiness, a high index of suspicion, close monitoring, good 
planning, and vigilance are key to controlling outbreaks like the one in 
2003" (Magee, 2004, p. 2). 
r 
r 
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APPENDIX A 
WHO Update 
Update 11- WHO recommends new measures to prevent travel-related 
spread of SARS 
27 March 2003 
WHO is today recommending new measures, related to international travel, aimed 
at reducing the risk of further international spread of severe acute respiratory 
syndrome (SARS). 
The recommended measures include screening of air passengers departing from a 
small number of affected areas on flights to another country. The affected areas, 
where transmission of the SARS infectious agent is known to be spreading in a 
human-to-human chain, are kept under constant review and posted each day on 
the WHO web site. At present, only four countries are concerned. (see affected 
areas) 
No additional precautions for the screening of departing passengers at airports in 
any other parts of the world are called for in today' s recommendations. 
The screening measures, recommended for consideration by national health 
officials and port authorities, involve an interview with passengers, departing 
from a limited number of areas, to detect illness with symptoms that give reason 
to suspect that a passenger may be infected with SARS. 
National authorities may wish to advise travelers with fever, departing on 
international flights from the few areas where SARS transmission has been 
documented, to postpone travel until they feel better. All international travelers 
should be aware of the symptoms ofSARS and seek immediate medical attention 
should symptoms occur. Clinicians hold virtual conference on management of 
SARS patients 
Since global surveillance of SARS began at the end of February, some evidence 
suggests that a small number of suspected and probable cases of SARS have 
departed from the small number of affected countries on flights to other countries. 
Most cases continue to occur in persons in close face-to-face contact with SARS 
patients. Close face-to-face contact could conceivably occur in an aircraft among 
persons seated close to a person infected with SARS and coughing or sneezing. 
WHO has also issued detailed recommendations to airlines on steps to take should 
a suspected case ofSARS be detected in flight. The WHO recommendations 
include advice on step-by-step procedures for following up fellow passengers on 
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the flight who may have had close contact with the possible case and the specific 
advice that should be given to these travelers and their families. 
WHO recommends that contacts of a person be allowed to continue to travel so 
long as they do not have symptoms compatible with SARS. 
The WHO case definition, which is being widely used for surveillance purposes, 
is posted at the WHO web site and is kept nnder constant review. Case 
Definitions for Surveillance of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) 
Many national health authorities have also issued SARS-related advice to 
international travelers. 
Sonrce: WHO. (2003c). Update I I-WHO recommends new measnres to prevent 
travel-related spread of SARS, http:www. who.int/csc/sars/archive/2003 _ 03 _ 27/en 
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APPENDIXB 
Legal Code for Isolation and Quarantine 
UNITED STATES CODE 
TITLE 42- THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE 
CHAPTER 6A- PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE 
SUBCHAPTER II - GENERAL POWERS AND DUTIES 
Part G - Quarantine and Inspection 
§ 264. Regulations to control communicable diseases 
(a) Promulgation and enforcement by Surgeon General 
The Surgeon General, with the approval of the Secretary, is authorized to make 
and enforce such regulations as in his judgment are necessary to prevent the 
introduction, transmission, or spread of communicable diseases from foreign 
countries into the States or possessions, or from one State or possession into any 
other State or possession. For purposes of carrying out and enforcing such 
regulations, the Surgeon General may provide for such inspection, fumigation, 
disinfection, sanitation, pest extermination, destruction of animals or articles 
found to be so infected or contaminated as to be sources of dangerous infection to 
human beings, and other measures, as in his judgment may be necessary. 
(b) Apprehension, detention, or conditional release of individuals 
Regulations prescribed under this section shall not provide for the apprehension, 
detention, or conditional release of individuals except for the purpose of 
preventing the introduction, transmission, or spread of such communicable 
diseases as may be specified from time to time in Executive orders of the 
President upon the recommendation of the National Advisory Health Council and 
the Surgeon General. 
(c) Application of regulations to persons entering from foreign countries 
Except as provided in subsection (d) of this section, regulations prescribed under 
this section, insofar as they provide for the apprehension, detention, examination, 
or conditional release of individuals, shall be applicable only to individuals 
coming into a State or possession from a foreigu country or a possession. 
(d) Apprehension and examination of persons reasonably believed to be infected 
On recommendation of the National Advisory Health Council, regulations 
prescribed under this section may provide for the apprehension and examination 
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of any individual reasonably believed to be infected with a communicable disease 
in a communicable stage and (1) to be moving or about to move from a State to 
another State; or (2) to be a probable source of infection to individuals who, while 
infected with such disease in a communicable stage, will be moving from a State 
to another State. Such regulations may provide that if upon examination any such 
individual is found to be infected, he may be detained for such time and in such 
manner as may be reasonably necessary. For purposes of this subsection, the term 
"State" includes, in addition to the several States, only the District of Columbia. 
265. Suspension of entries and imports from designated places to prevent spread 
of communicable diseases 
Whenever the Surgeon General determines that by reason of the existence of any 
communicable disease in a foreign country there is serious danger of the 
introduction of such disease into the United States, and that this danger is so 
increased by the introduction of persons or property from such country that a 
suspension of the right to introduce such persons and property is required in the 
interest of the public health, the Surgeon GeneraL in accordance with regulations 
approved by the President, shall have the power to prohibit, in whole or in part, 
the introduction of persons and property from such countries or places as he shall 
designate in order to avert such danger, and for such period of time as he may 
deem necessary for such purpose. 
§ 266. Special quarantine powers in time of war 
To protect the military and naval forces and war workers of the United States, in 
time of war, against any communicable disease specified in Executive orders as 
provided in subsection (b) of section 264 of this title, the Surgeon General, on 
recommendation of the National Advisory Health Council, is authorized to 
provide by regulations for the apprehension and examination, in time of war, of 
any individual reasonably believed (1) to be infected with such disease in a 
communicable stage and (2) to be a probable source of infection to members of 
the armed forces of the United States or to individuals engaged in the production 
or transportation of arms, munitions, ships, food, clothing, or other supplies for 
the armed forces. Such regulations may provide that if upon examination any such 
individual is found to be so infected, he may be detained for such time and in such 
manner as may be reasonably necessary. 
§ 267. Quarantine stations, grounds, and anchorages 
(a) Control and management Except as provided in title II of the Act of June 15, 
1917, as amended (50 U.S.C. 191 et seq.), the Surgeon General shall control, 
direct, and manage all United States quarantine stations, grounds, and anchorages, 
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designate their boundaries, and designate the quarantine officers to be in charge 
thereof. With the approval of the President he shall from time to time select 
suitable sites for and establish such additional stations, grounds, and anchorages 
in the States and possessions of the United States as in his judgment are necessary 
to prevent the introduction of communicable diseases into the States and 
possessions of the United States. 
(b) Hours of inspection The Surgeon General shall establish the hours during 
which quarantine service shall be performed at each quarantine station, and, upon 
application by any interested party, may establish quarantine inspection during the 
twenty-four hours of the day, or any fraction thereof, at such quarantine stations 
as, in his opinion, require such extended service. He may restrict the performance 
of quarantine inspection to hours of daylight for such arriving vessels as cannot, 
in his opinion, be satisfactorily inspected during hours of darkness. No vessel 
shall be required to undergo quarantine inspection during the hours of darkness, 
unless the quarantine officer at such quarantine station shall deem an immediate 
inspection necessary to protect the public health. Uniformity shall not be required 
in the hours during which quarantine inspection may be obtained at the various 
ports of the United States. 
Source: U.S. Codes (2003). Title 42: Regulations to Control Communicable 
Diseases. Retrieved November 12, 2004 from 
http :1 I caselaw.lp. findlaw. com/ casecode/uscodes/4 2/ chapters/6al subchapters/ii/part 
s/g/section 264.html 
